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Draft lottery number assignment during the Vietnam Era provides a natural experiment to examine
the effects of military service on crime. Using exact dates of birth for inmates in state and federal prisons
in 1979, 1986, and 1991, we find that draft eligibility increases incarceration for violent crimes but
decreases incarceration for non-violent crimes among whites. This is particularly evident in 1979,
where two-sample instrumental variable estimates indicate that military service increases the probability
of incarceration for a violent crime by 0.34 percentage points and decreases the probability of incarceration
for a nonviolent crime by 0.30 percentage points. We conduct two falsification tests, one that applies
each of the three binding lotteries to unaffected cohorts and another that considers the effects of lotteries












\CRIMINALS ARE MADE, NOT BORN."
|Stenciled sign left behind by Michigan school board member and suicidal mass
murderer Andrew Kehoe after killing 45 people, mostly school children.
Understanding the extent to which criminals are \made" and, further, identifying the de-
terminants of criminal behavior is of utmost importance to any society that wants to reduce
crime. To date, most research in this area has focused on the causal eects of individuals'
immediate environments.1 Quasi-experimental studies that explore how individuals' back-
grounds aect criminal behavior are more rare with a handful of studies on neighborhoods
(Oreopoulos 2006), education (Lochner and Moretti 2004), foster care (Doyle 2008), peers
(Bayer, Hjalmarsson, and Pozen's 2009), and beauty (Mocan and Tekin 2010) providing
notable exceptions. In this paper, we add to this strand of the literature by exploiting the
randomness of the national Vietnam draft lotteries to examine the eects of military service
on subsequent incarceration.
Our study also has implications for the military and for the treatment of veterans. First,
this paper can be thought of as exploring a potentially important long-term cost of military
engagements that might be important for comprehensive cost-benet considerations. Second,
our results speak to what types of special accommodations might be reasonably made for
those who have served in the military. This is an issue that has been taken quite seriously
in the criminal justice system, as special courts that focus on rehabilitation have been set
up to try cases involving non-violent veteran oenders. Further, the results of our analysis
1For example, researchers have considered the eects of punishments for infractions (Levitt 1998; Drago
Galbiati, and Vertrova 2009), policing (Levitt 1997; Levitt 2002; McCrary 2002; Yang 2008), punishment
(Lee and McCrary 2009; Hansen 2011) temporary income shocks (Miguel 2005; Foley 2011), unemployment
(Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard 2006; Mocan and Bali 2010), inequality (Kelly 2000), drugs and alcohol
(Grogger and Willis 2000; Carpenter 2007; Carpenter and Dobkin 2008), neighborhoods (Ludwig, Duncan,
and Hirscheld 2001; Kling, Ludwig, and Katz 2004), guns (Duggan 2001; Duggan, Hamjalmarrson, and
Jacob forthcoming), sporting events and movies (Rees and Schnepel 2009; Card and Dahl 2009; Dahl and
DellaVigna 2009), casinos (Grinols and Mustard 2006), and incapacitation (Jacob and Lefgren 2003; Dahl
and DellaVigna 2009).
1can inform the extent to which resources ought to be allocated towards the treatment of
veterans who might exhibit signs of instability.
While we consider the impacts of military service on multiple types of crimes, our primary
focus is on violent crimes. Although this would be a natural choice for any study considering
the eects of military service on crime since the military trains soldiers to engage in violence,
the Vietnam Era provides an especially interesting context. Notably, the Vietnam Era coin-
cided with an important shift in military training motivated by S.L.A. Marshall's pioneering
research documenting extremely-low ring rates for U.S. soldiers serving in World War II.
In order to overcome soldiers reluctance to re at enemy combatants, in the late-1960s the
military began making conscious eorts to provide more realistic training scenarios (Gross-
man 2009).2 While this desensitization to engaging in violence may be crucial to survival
in a combat zone, it is easy to see how it might lead to problems after a soldier returns to
civilian life.3
Of course, there are several other possible mechanisms through which military service
might aect crime. Engagements with real-enemy combatants in the combat zone has been
shown to have impacts over and above the eects of being in the military (Rohlfs 2010;
Galiani, Rossi, and Schargrodsky 2011; Cesur, Sabia, and Tekin 2011). In addition, military
service may increase crime because it precludes labor market experience and thus reduces
wages (Angrist 1990; Imbens and van der Klaauw 1995; Abadie 2002; Angrist and Chen
2For example, using silhouettes in place of bulls-eye targets. Slone and Friedman (2008) describe modern
training as preparing soldiers \to react within a split-second of any provocative activity and [to shut down]
emotions."
3In a similar fashion, this training may in part be responsible for some of the violent conicts amongst
fellow servicemen. In Another Brother, Greg Payton describes one such conict:
We had been brought to Vietnam for violence, for violent purposes, so it wasn't unusual for
us to be violent amongst ourselves you know. I remember the rst time I got shot at it was
Christmas Eve and an African American GI had a ght with a white GI. The white GI went
back to his hooch and he got his weapon. We heard a weapon being loaded. Instinctively we
hit the ground and he opened up automatic re. It was just by split seconds that we weren't
all killed.
22011; Siminski and Ville 2011) or because of possible eects on opiate use (Robins, Davis,
and Goodwin 1974). On the other hand, the discipline imparted by the military environment
may make individuals less likely to commit crimes. Further, military service could reduce
criminality via an incapacitation eect, as individuals are in the military environment at the
ages at which they are at highest risk of incarceration.
A sizable literature links military service to criminal behavior, particularly to violent
behavior, but much of the prior work on this topic lacks plausibly exogenous variation and
focuses on small non-random samples. Exogenous variation in military service is crucial
since men who are more likely to engage in criminal activities may be disproportionately
likely to enlist. Galiani, Rossi, and Schargrodsky (2011) overcome this selection bias using
variation driven by Argentina's draft lotteries. Relative to our study, this earlier work has
the advantage of being able to explore cohorts serving the Malvinas War and others serving
during peacetime. However, it is somewhat limited in its ability to measure impacts by type
of crime, which can only be identied for those going through the criminal justice system
approximately 20{30 years after service. Our results suggest that this limitation is not trivial,
as we nd osetting eects on incarceration for violent and nonviolent crimes seven to nine
years after conscription.4
In this paper, we also use variation provided by draft lotteries but focus on the U.S.
context. In particular, our identifying variation is driven by: (1) the Vietnam Era draft
lotteries which randomly assigned lottery numbers to exact dates of birth and (2) the fact
4Rohlfs (2006) is the only prior work to use plausibly exogenous variation to consider the eects of
military service on incarceration in the U.S. In this study, in which he compares the fraction of Vietnam
Era draft eligible inmates in prison to the fraction expected based on cohorts not subjected to the drafts, he
nds imprecise eects eects on overall rates of incarceration. Our study oers several advantages over this
work. First, we improve precision by using within cohort variation provided by the draft lotteries instead of
a cross-cohort dierence-in-dierences framework. This further enables us to use non-aected cohorts as a
robustness check to verify that our results are not driven by the particular sets of birthdays selected in the
drafts. In addition, our outcome variable lends itself to a natural interpretation, providing a direct estimate
of the eect of draft eligibility on the probability of incarceration in the survey years. Finally, we present
a more-comprehensive exploration of the eects of draft eligibility on crime by separately considering its
eects on violent crime, drug-related crime, property-related crime, and public-order crime.
3that the military drafted men, starting with the lowest lottery numbers, until manpower
requirements were met each year. Utilizing this exogenous variation in draft status, we are
able to determine the extent to which military service aects criminal behavior by comparing
the probability of incarceration (based on the number births) for those whose lottery numbers
were called to report for induction into the military to the incarceration rates those whose
numbers were not called. We do this by combining data from the 1979, 1986, and 1991
Surveys of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities (SISFCF) with data from the
Vital Statistics of the United States to create measures of incarceration probabilities for each
day of birth for the cohorts aected by the draft lotteries. We supplement this analysis with
data on prison admissions from 1983{1991 via the National Corrections Reporting Program
(NCRP).
While these inmate data are well-suited to identifying the eect of draft eligibility, they
are not well-suited to directly estimating the eect of military service. In particular, it would
be inappropriate to estimate the rst-stage eect of draft eligibility on military service using
an endogenously-selected subsample of individuals exposed to the draft, such as a sample
of inmates. For this reason, we obtain rst-stage estimates for the overall population using
restricted U.S. Census data from 2000. Combining the estimates from each of these sources,
we obtain two-sample instrumental-variable estimates of the eect of military service on
incarceration. We discuss potential threats to the validity of this approach in Section 4.
We nd evidence of positive impacts on incarceration for violent crimes among whites
and osetting impacts of a similar magnitude on incarceration for nonviolent crimes. This
is particularly evident in 1979, where two-sample instrumental variable estimates indicate
that military service increases the probability of incarceration for a violent crime by 0.34
percentage points and decreases the probability of incarceration for a nonviolent crime by
0.30 percentage points. We nd less convincing evidence of impacts on nonwhites.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the
4Vietnam Era draft lotteries. Sections 3 and 4 describe our data and empirical strategy.
Section 5 presents our results and robustness checks. Section 6 discusses our results and
concludes.
2 Background on the Draft Lotteries
In an attempt to fairly allocate military service in Vietnam, a total of seven national lottery
drawings were held to determine who would serve in the military|although conscription was
halted after the third lottery. The three lotteries used to draft servicemen were held in 1969,
1970, and 1971. While the 1969 lottery applied to those born 1944{1950, each subsequent
drawing applied only to men who turned 18 in the year of the lottery. In particular, the 1970
lottery applied to those born in 1951 and the 1971 lottery applied to those born in 1952.
In each drawing, the birthdays of the year were randomly assigned a Random Sequence
Number (RSN). In the 1969 drawing September 1st was assigned RSN 1 so men born on
September 1st were asked to report to their local draft boards for potential induction before
men born on other days. April 24th was assigned RSN 2 so men born on that day were asked
to report second, and so forth. The military continued to call men for potential induction in
order of RSN until the manpower requirements were met for that year. The last RSN called
for service, also known as the highest Administrative Processing Number (APN), was 195 for
the 1969 drawing, 125 for the 1970 drawing, and 95 for the 1971 drawing. Throughout the
paper, we refer to indivduals with RSNs less than or equal to the APN as \draft eligible."
While the issue was addressed for later drawings, there was a noteworthy mechanical
problem with the randomization mechanism used in the 1969 drawing. In particular, each
birthday was coded onto a capsule and these capsules were added month by month into a
drawer, with the drawer being \shued" after each month. As a result of incomplete mixing,
dates later in the year remained on top of the pile and were more likely to be drawn rst and
5thus called rst for induction (Fienberg 1971). This phenomenon is shown in Figure A1 in
the appendix, which plots the number of draft eligible days by month for each lottery. To the
extent to which people born in later months might be more or less likely to commit crimes,
this could lead to omitted variable bias. We follow the previous literature and address this
potential issue by controlling for year by month of birth xed eects in our analysis (Conley
and Heerwing 2009, Eisenberg and Rowe 2009, Angrist, Chen, and Frandsen 2010, Angrist
and Chen 2011).5
For multiple reasons, military service is not perfectly predicted by being born on a draft-
eligible day. Men born on non-eligible birthdays could volunteer and men born on eligible
days could fail the medical exams, refuse to report, or apply for various exemptions. Despite
these issues, the draft had a signicant eect on military service, the magnitude of which is
discussed in Section 5.1.
3 Data Description and Construction
Our primary analysis uses data on incarceration from the 1979, 1986, and 1991 Surveys of
Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities (SISFCF), which are representative of the
prison population in state and federal correctional facilities. Although it would be desirable
to use the 1974 survey to consider potential incapacitation eects, exact dates of birth are
not available for this survey year. In addition to exact dates of birth, the survey waves we
use contain information on each prisoner's race, sex, and the type of oense for which he
was incarcerated. The type of oense is classied according to approximately 80 oense
codes and each inmate is associated with up to four dierent oense codes (since inmates
can concurrently serve time for multiple oenses). We dene a prisoner as incarcerated for a
violent crime if any of the listed oenses involve violence and as incarcerated for a nonviolent
5Information on the details of the Vietnam Draft lottery can be found at the Selective Service Website
http://www.sss.gov/lotter1.htm and in Flynn (1993) and Baskir and Strauss (1978).
6crime if none of the listed oenses involve violence.
The 1979, 1986, and 1991 waves of the SISFCF used in this analysis contain information
on 6642, 6612, and 6631 male inmates subjected to the drafts, respectively. In selecting
an appropriate sample to analyze, there is a tradeo between ease of interpretation of the
results and sample size. The most-straightforward results to interpret are those where data
are limited to a single survey wave. For example, if we limit the sample to cells collapsed
from the 1979 data, the estimates will provide the estimated eect of military service on the
probability of being incarcerated seven to nine years after conscription. The interpretation
is more complicated when we expand the sample to include all three survey waves, where we
are estimating a combination of the probabilities of being observed in prison 7{9, 14{16, and
19{21 years later. On the other hand, pooling survey years can improve precision. For this
reason, we present estimates that utilize all of the available data and estimates stratied on
survey years.
Limiting the sample to males, we conduct the analysis separately for whites and non-
whites at the date of birth by survey year level. Each observation represents a collapsed cell
measuring the probability of incarceration in survey year s for individuals born on day d.
To construct this variable, we divide the number of male convicts we observe in prison in
survey year s with date of birth d, calculated using the SISFCF's sampling weights, by the





The denominator for the equation above comes from the Vital Statistics of the United States
(VSUS) which reports births by race, gender, and month. Since the VSUS only reports
births by month prior to 1969, we construct the number of births for each given day. We
report results in which the number of births in each month are apportioned evenly across
7the days in the month. The results are nearly identical using strategies for constructing the
denominator that adjust for diering birth patterns observed on weekdays versus weekends.
These robustness checks are described further in the appendix.
The data used to estimate the rst-stage eect of draft eligibility on military service
are from the 2000 Census long-form sample, which includes approximately one-sixth of U.S.
households. For more details on these data, see Angrist and Chen (2011) whose sample is
identical.
To properly link each birthday with a particular draft lottery number we use the draft
lottery information available from the Selective Service System. This allows us to associate
each birth date with a lottery number for each of the lotteries.
4 Empirical Strategy
If military service were purely random, we could use our data to analyze the eect of military
service on incarceration rates by estimating
IncarcerationProbabilitysd =  +   V eteranProbabilityd + usd; (2)
where IncarcerationProbabilitysd is the fraction of individuals born on day d who are in-
carcerated in survey year s and V eteranProbabilityd is the fraction of veterans among those
who were born on day d. Because selection into the military is not random, this approach
would likely lead to biased estimates of . Perhaps of greatest concern is the possibility that
aggressive individuals are more likely to serve in the military and also to commit crimes, in
which case the eect of being a veteran, , would be would be biased upwards. Alternatively,
if individuals with more respect for authority are more likely to become veterans and less
8likely to commit crimes then  will be biased downwards.6 Given the random assignment of
draft eligibility by date of birth, we instead estimate
IncarcerationProbabilitysd =  +   DraftEligibled + sd (3)
where DraftEligibled is an indicator variable that equals one if men born on date d are
assigned a lottery number that makes them eligible to be drafted into the military and zero
otherwise. The parameter  provides the estimate of the average reduced-form eect of draft
eligibility on the probability of incarceration. Due to the mechanical issues associated with
the draft lotteries described above and because the data span multiple survey years, we also
include year by month of birth xed eects and survey year xed eects where applicable.7
To recover the estimated eect of military service on the probability of incarceration, we
need to know the eect of draft eligibility on military service, which can be estimated by
V eteranProbabilityd =  +   DraftEligibled + !d: (4)
Because an unbiased estimate of  requires data on a random sample of the population,
as opposed to an endogenously-selected subsample of inmates, we estimate the person-level
analogue of Equation 4 using restricted-use U.S. Census data from 2000.8 We then obtain the
two-sample instrumental-variable estimate by taking the ratio of the reduced-form estimate





6Note that, although aggregation to the date-of-birth level may lessen such concerns, they would likely
remain because of seasonal patterns in fertility that are associated with socioeconomic status (Buckles and
Hungerman 2010). This approach is also problematic because, outside of the cohorts subject to the draft
lotteries, there is unlikely to be much variation in veteran status across dates of birth.
7While it is desirable to control for other covariates to increase the precision of estimates, Angrist (1989)
suggests that this is not necessary to avoid bias since there is no correlation between draft lottery status and
characteristics besides subsequent veteran status.
8That is, we regress whether an individual is a veteran on whether an individual was draft eligible.
9and estimate its standard error using the delta method.9 The standard-error estimates for
the rst-stage and reduced-form estimates used in this calculation are clustered on lottery
numbers to address the fact that the former is based on individual-level data while the latter
is based on data aggregated to the birth-date level.
While random assignment ensures that ^  will be unbiased, the instrumental variables
estimation strategy relies on the assumption that veteran status is the only mechanism of
transmission between draft eligibility and the probability of incarceration. We acknowledge
that ^  will be biased if draft eligibility also aects incarceration probabilities through other
mechanisms. It has been documented that eligibility had a positive impact on educational
attainment (Angrist and Krueger 1992, Card and Lemieux 2001; and Angrist and Chen
2011).10 To the extent that increased education levels lead to decreased crime (Lochner and
Moretti 2004) the extra education conferred by draft eligibility should bias our estimates of 
downward. Another potential issue is that military service might aect incarceration through
its impacts on mortality; however researchers have found little evidence that military service
aects health (Conley and Heerwig 2009; Dobkin and Shabani 2009; Siminski and Ville
2011), which might be explained by the generous health benets that tend to be provided to
veterans.11 In addition, the fact that our data exclude those serving in military prisons may
cause us to understate the eect of military service on criminal behavior. In addition, we
acknowledge that impacts on crime may diverge from impacts on incarceration if military
service aects the probability of getting caught conditional on committing a crime or if
veterans receive dierential treatment from law enforcement ocers or judges. We should
also note that this instrumental variable approach identies the local average treatment eect
9In particular, we assume cov(^ ; ^ ) = 0, which is likely to hold since the the estimates are based on





^ 4 . Bootstrapping produces nearly identical
standard-error estimates.
10In contrast to these studies focusing on the United States, Siminski (forthcoming) nds no evidence of
similar eects for Australia where there was no GI Bill.
11Bedard and Desch^ enes (2006) provide a notable exception, nding that military service in World War II
and the Korean War led to increased mortality due to increased smoking.
10(LATE), or the eect of military service on those individuals who can be compelled to enter
the military by the draft lotteries.
5 Results
This section is organized into multiple parts. We begin by presenting estimates of the rst-
stage eect of draft eligibility on military service. Next, we show summary statistics for
incarceration probabilities and provide visual evidence supporting our main results. We
then present our main results, which are followed by robustness checks to verify that these
results are not driven by the particular birthdays that were drawn in any given lottery or
by avoidance behaviors among eligible men. Finally, we conduct a supplementary analysis
using prison admissions data from 1983{1991.
5.1 First Stage Eect of Eligibility on Military Service
As described above, an unbiased estimate of the eect of the Vietnam draft lotteries on
military service requires a random sample of individuals exposed to the draft. We obtain
these estimates using restricted-use U.S. Census data from 2000.12
Table 1 shows how draft eligibility aected military service for the 1944{1952 cohorts.
As demonstrated in earlier studies, draft eligibility did not have a signicant impact on
the earliest of these cohorts subject to the national lottery|this is not surprising because
a large share of the capable men in these cohorts were already called to serve via local
drafts. In subsequent sections we follow the existing literature and focus on the 1948{1952
cohorts, for whom the rst-stage estimate is clearly strong for both whites and nonwhites.
12Because of condentiality requirements, we do not have direct access to this data. These results are
based on specications that Josh Angrist and Stacey Chen have generously run for us. Angrist and Chen
(2011) also explore a specication in which the eects are interacted with groups of lottery numbers. They
nd that these additional instruments do not increase precision. For this reason, we focus on the single
instrument case which simplies statistical inference for the two-sample instrumental-variable estimates.
11For these cohorts, eligibility increased the probability of military service by approximately
11 percentage points for whites and 7 percentage points for nonwhites, on average, with
especially large impacts for those born 1950{1952.
5.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2 presents incarceration probabilities by survey wave, race, and draft eligibility sta-
tus.13 The table separately considers incarceration for all crimes, violent crimes, drug-related
crimes, property crimes, and public order crimes.14 These categories are mutually exclusive,
but since an inmate can be concurrently serving time for multiple oenses, he may contribute
to multiple lines in the table. In most cases, the statistics in Table 2 suggest that induction
had only a small eect, if any, on criminality among whites. On the other hand, they suggest
that induction increased incarceration for violent crimes by approximately 15 percent.
5.3 Visual Evidence
Figures 1 through 4 plot estimated probabilities of male incarceration by quarter of birth and
draft eligibility. Although the data can be used to construct more-disaggregated (e.g., month,
week, day) plots, aggregating to the quarterly level better allows us to discern patterns in
the data; however, we also present month-level plots in the appendix.
Figure 1 focuses on white males incarcerated for violent crimes, with separate panels
for those incarcerated in 1979, 1986, and 1991. Though the estimates are somewhat noisy,
incarceration probabilities in 1979 appear systematically higher for those who are draft
eligible relative to those whose birthdays made them ineligible. In particular, the estimated
13In the Appendix, tables A1, A2, and A3 present similar statistics by draft cohort.
14We follow the National Prisoner Statistics oense code categorization. Violent crimes include any at-
tempt at murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, robbery, assault, or extortion. Drug-related crimes in-
clude trac in or possession of drugs. Property crimes include robbery, extortion, burglary, auto theft,
fraud, larceny, embezzlement, any stolen property crime, and drug tracking. Finally, public order crimes
are more varied but primarily consist of weapons violations and serious trac oenses.
12probability of incarceration is higher among those who are draft eligible for 15 of 20 birth
quarters. It is also the case that incarceration probabilities are usually higher among those
who are draft eligible in 1986 and 1991 although this is less clear to the eye.
Figure 2 shows similar graphs for white males incarcerated for nonviolent crimes. The
estimates are again imprecise but collectively suggest that incarceration probabilities for
nonviolent crimes are lower in 1979 and 1986 among those were draft eligible.
Figures 3 and 4 show similar graphs for nonwhite males incarcerated for violent and non-
white violent crimes, respectively. These graphs largely suggest that there is no relationship
between draft eligibility and incarceration among nonwhites. The one exception, investi-
gated in more detail below, is that incarceration for violent crimes appears higher among
the draft eligible population than the ineligible population in 1991.
These gures provide suggestive evidence of eects on criminal behavior, though the
means presented in these gures are rather noisy. For this reason, we pool all of the cohorts
together in the next section to improve precision.15
5.4 Main Results
Table 3 reports the estimated eects of draft eligibility and military service on incarceration
probabilities among whites, with separate panels for violent crimes, nonviolent crimes, and
all crimes. The data are aggregated to the exact date of birth by survey year level. The
estimates control for month by year of birth xed eects to deal with the fact that later
birth months had a higher probability of being drawn in the 1969 draft due to mechanical
problems with the lottery board's randomization method.
Column 1 shows estimates that pool data from the three survey years while also control-
ling for survey year xed eects. These estimates echo the results presented in the previous
15With more data, it would be quite informative to obtain separate estimates for each cohort, especially
because they had diering experiences as the war was winding down when the youngest cohorts served.
13section. The estimated impact on incarceration for a violent crime is signicant at the
ten-percent level, indicating that eligibility increased the probability of incarceration by ap-
proximately 0.03 percentage points. The corresponding two-sample instrumental-variables
estimate indicates that Vietnam Era military service increased the probability of incarcera-
tion for a violent crime by 0.27 percentage points. In contrast, these data indicate a negative
eect on incarceration for a nonviolent crime, although this estimate is not close to being
statistically signicant at any conventional level. That said, because of this osetting im-
pact, the estimated eect on the probability of incarceration for any crime (Panel C, Column
1) is close to zero.
Columns 2 through 4 stratify on the three survey years, with the most precise estimates
using data from 1979 and the least precise estimates using data from 1991. To put these
results into context, it is important to keep in mind that the men conscripted by the lotteries
would have nished their mandatory service ve to seven years before the 1979 survey was
conducted.
The estimates using data from 1979 (Column 2) are qualitatively similar but stronger
than the estimates that pool together the three survey years. The estimated impact of
Vietnam Era military service on incarceration for a violent crime is 0.34 percentage points and
signicant at the ve-percent level. The estimated impact on incarceration for a nonviolent
crime is of a similar magnitude (-0.30 percentage points) and signicant at the ten-percent
level. Not surprisingly then, the estimated impact on incarceration for any crime is close to
zero.16
The estimates using data from 1986 are qualitatively similar but do dier in important
ways. In particular, the estimated impact on incarceration for a violent crime is smaller
in magnitude (0.15 percentage points) and the estimated impact on incarceration for a
16Correlational evidence based on the 1980 Census suggests a small but signicant negative eect of service
in Vietnam on being observed in a correctional facility.
14nonviolent crime is larger in magnitude (-0.47 percentage points). However, these estimates
are not close to being statistically distinguishable from those focusing on incarceration in
1979.
The estimates using data from 1991 suggest a positive eect on incarceration for a violent
crime and no eect on incarceration for a non-violent crime. That said, these estimates the
least precise among those shown in Table 3, with standard error estimates two- to three-times
larger than similar estimates using data from 1979.
Table 4 presents estimates for nonwhite men. These estimates suggest there is no eect
of Vietnam Era service on incarceration for violent crimes in 1979 or 1986 but, curiously,
indicate an large eect in 1991. These estimates suggest that there was either a large delayed
impact on nonwhite males that manifested in the late 1980s or that the 1991 estimate
is a statistical artifact. The results in Section 5.7, where we estimate impacts on prison
admissions from 1983{1991, suggest that the latter explanation is most likely.
The estimated eects on nonwhite incarceration for nonviolent crimes are never statis-
tically signicant and, like the estimated eects on incarceration for violent crimes, vary in
sign. That said, it is important to note that the rst stage is relatively small for nonwhites
and thus the condence intervals relatively large. We cannot rule out that the eects of
military service are the same for whites and nonwhites.
5.5 Estimates Using More-Narrow Crime Categories
In order to shed light on our main results, tables 5 and 6 show the eect of draft eligibility
on subcategories of violent, property, and drug related crimes. Because incarceration proba-
bilities are small for these narrowly-dened categories, these tables report estimated eects
per 10,000 births instead of per person. These estimates should be interpreted with caution
because the sample size of inmates contributing to each estimate is relatively small when
the data has been disaggregated in this fashion. As a result, the estimates rarely rise to the
15level of statistical signicance and often change signs when considering data from dierent
survey years.
The estimates that are relatively robust for whites (Table 5) suggest that the overall
impact on violent crime among whites is driven by incarcerations for murder, robbery and
kidnapping oenses. In contrast, the estimated impacts on nonviolent crime categories are
not suciently robust to yield insight into our earlier results. The estimates for nonwhites
(Table 6) demonstrate that the estimated impact on violent crime in 1991 among nonwhites
is driven by robberies. More broadly, the estimated eects on these narrow categories of
crime are not robust across survey years for nonwhites, with the exception of burglary for
which we sometimes see signicantly elevated rates among the draft eligible population.
5.6 Robustness Checks Using Lotteries for Unaected Cohorts
In this section, we conduct two falsication tests, similar in spirit to those in Galiani, Rossi,
and Schargrodsky (2011), in order to address potential concerns regarding the use of the
lottery for identication.
One possible concern with our main estimation strategy is that, despite being random, the
rst numbers drawn (which led to eligibility) may have included a disproportionate number
of birth dates that we would expect to be associated with higher rates of crime even if no
one was called to serve in the military. For example, this could occur if men born on dates
with the earliest lottery numbers disproportionately came from disadvantaged backgrounds.
To verify that this type of phenomenon is not driving our results, we apply each of
the three lotteries to cohorts that the given lottery did not aect and conduct the analysis
as before. For example, we test the 1969 draft that applied to the 1944{1950 cohorts by
matching the 1969 lottery numbers to the birth dates in the 1941{1942 and 1951{1959 cohorts
and testing for eects. Since the 1969 lottery did not actually apply to these cohorts, we
should not nd signicant eects unless the 1969 lottery suered from the potential problem
16described above. We test each lottery using all of the unaected cohorts that our data sets
allow us to cover, ranging from 1942{1959.17
The results of this falsication exercise, by race and crime type, are presented in Table
7. Consistent with random assignment, the estimates are neither uniformly positive nor
uniformly negative. Further, just two of the 48 \placebo tests" are signicant at the ten-
percent level.
A second possible concern with our empirical strategy relates to the validity of the exclu-
sion restriction for the two-sample instrumental-variable estimates. In particular, one might
be concerned that draft-eligible men may have engaged in draft avoidance behaviors that
could aect their probability of incarceration.18 Using hypothetical APNs taken from the
1969, 1970, and 1971 drawings, we test for this possibility by considering possible eects on
men who were assigned low draft lottery numbers in the four non-binding lotteries that took
place in 1972{1975. Since these lottery numbers were assigned but their results were not
used to induct men into the military, we expect to see no link between low lottery numbers
and violent crime unless lottery numbers aected criminality through mechanisms besides
military service. Table 8 shows these results by race and crime type. Again, the results are
not consistently positive or negative and just two of 48 are statistically signicant at the
ten-percent level.19
17We cannot use earlier cohorts in this falsication exercise because earlier Vital Statistics of the United
States reports do not provide birth data by month, gender, and race.
18Of particular concern, although the evidence is based on a very small sample, Kuziemko (2008) presents
suggestive evidence that men with low lottery numbers may have engaged in delinquent behaviors to avoid
being drafted. She also examines Georgia prison admissions data and nds that men with low lottery numbers
in the non-binding 1972 lottery were over-represented. We also examine the 1972 lottery as a robustness
check and nd no detectable relationship between low lottery number and being incarcerated for the serious
crimes that would have kept an oender in prison until the 1979 inmate survey. One possible reconciliation
of our ndings is that while some men may have \dodged down" into prison to avoid conscription, they did
not commit the serious crimes with multi-year sentences we examine here.
19As another robustness check, we have considered the interaction between incarceration for a violent
crime and non-Army military service as an outcome. Since nearly all drafted men served in the Army, we
should not nd signicant eects on this outcome. Indeed, we nd draft eligibility signicantly raises the
probability of being a violent oender and an army veteran and has no eect on being a violent oender and
a veteran from another branch of service.
175.7 Analysis of Prison Admissions Data, 1983{1991
In this section we use data from the NCRP to further investigate some of the results presented
in prior sections. The NCRP provides data on all prisoners admitted to state correctional
facilities on an annual basis. Although these data track all movements across prisons, we
focus on admissions that are due to court commitments to reduce the likelihood of \double
counting" prisoners. As in previous sections, we combine these data with vital statistics
data, which are used for the denominator of the outcome variable. However, here we use the
number of number of individuals admitted per 10,000 births at the exact date of birth level
since the number of inmates admitted into prison per year is relatively small.
Panels A and B of Table 9 show no systematic evidence that draft eligibility is related to
new admission of white prisoners in the mid-1980s to early 1990s, for violent or nonviolent
crimes. In light of the results shown in the previous sections, there are two potential expla-
nations for this nding. It may be the case that the eects of military service on criminal
behavior fade out as veterans spend more time as civilians. Or this nding may simply reect
an incapacitation eect|we may be less likely to observe impacts on prison admissions in
the 1980s because men who were aected most were already incarcerated in earlier years, as
evidenced by the signicant impacts we found on the prison population in 1979.
Panels C and D focus on admissions of nonwhite prisoners. Here, we again see no sys-
tematic evidence of a relationship between draft eligibility and prison admissions in the
mid-1980s to early 1990s. This suggests that the statistically signicant eect on of eligi-
bility on incarceration for violent crimes that manifests in the 1991 prisoner survey data is
likely a statistical artifact. Further corroborating this interpretation, we nd similar results
when we focus on robberies, the category that drove the aforementioned estimate in the
prisoner data.
186 Discussion and Conclusion
Our results highlight the importance of one's background on criminal behavior. We nd that
military service increases the probability of incarceration for violent crimes among whites,
with point estimates suggesting an impact of 0.27 percentage points. Putting aside dierences
between the United States and Argentina, these results may initially seem to be at odds with
Galiani, Rossi, and Schargrodsky (2011) who also exploit a draft lottery but do not nd any
evidence that military service aects violent crime. However, our analysis suggests that the
eects on violent crime manifest soon after military service is complete, as they are present
in 1979 for cohorts who served in the early 1970s. This is critical, as Galiani, Rossi, and
Schargrodsky (2011) would be unable to detect such eects in their analysis that identies
the 1958{1962 cohorts going through the criminal justice system from 2000{2005.
We also nd evidence of osetting impacts on incarceration for nonviolent crimes among
whites. This suggests that military service may not change an individual's propensity to
commit crime but instead may cause them to commit more-severe crimes involving violence.
While our identication strategy only allows us to estimate the eects of military service
on conscripts during the Vietnam Era, multiple features of today's military suggest that
our results may be relevant today. The military has continued and escalated the use of
highly realistic training simulations, a legacy of late-1960s eorts to desensitize soldiers to
engaging with enemy combatants. For example, the military currently uses Iraqi nationals
as role-players in training exercises in order to help cadets \put a human face and picture on
Iraqi society."20 In addition, the rates of posttraumatic stress disorder for veterans of Iraq
and Afganistan (14 to 25 percent) are quite similar to the rates for those who served in the
Vietnam War (18 to 20 percent).21
20For more details, see http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/06/17/40960-iraqi-role-players-add-realism-to-
cadet-training/.
21These statistics are congressional testimony by Thomas R. Insel before the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform in 2007. Available online at: http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2007/05/t20070524a.html
19Further, today's military readily acknowledges that soldiers often struggle with the tran-
sition to civilian life and that skills that promote success in combat can translate into un-
healthy behaviors at home. For this reason, each branch of the military has programs to
help ease the transition. Although research highlights some promising results for the average
soldier (Castro et al. 2006; Adler et al. 2009), recent evidence raises serious concerns about
the treatment of servicemen with the most-severe mental problems (Stahl 2009).22 Coupled
with this mixed evidence on the ecacy of the treatment provided to soldiers at risk of men-
tal health problems, our results, which demonstrate grave consequences of military service,
highlight the need for further research in this area.
Finally, our results have important implications for the legal system, which has 23
recently-established pilot courts that try only cases in which the oender is a veteran.23
Possibly out of some sense of society's responsibility for their behavior, these courts focus
on rehabilitation and treatment programs instead of incarceration. In 2008, senators Kerry
and Murkowski introduced legislation to extend the program nationally. The existence of
this special court system implicitly creates a separate legal class for veterans and tacitly
acknowledges that military service can have negative consequences that manifest in crimi-
nal behavior once servicemen return home. But these courts exclude the violent oenders.
Our analysis suggests that these are the oenses for which military service is most clearly
responsible.
22In response to a survey from the Warrior Transition Unit at Fort Hood, where physically and mentally
wounded soldiers are sent to heal, 41 percent of commanding ocers thought more than half of soldiers
claiming to have symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder were faking or exaggerating versus 11 percent
of nurse case managers.
23Details on these courts can be found at the Veterans Treatment Court Clearinghouse which is hosted by
the National Association of Drug Court Professionals.
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Probability of Incarceration for a Violent Crime by Draft Eligibility, White Males
Panel A: 1979 Data
Panel B: 1986 Data
Panel C: 1991 Data
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Probability of Incarceration for a Nonviolent Crime by Draft Eligibility, White Males
Panel A: 1979 Data
Panel B: 1986 Data
Panel C: 1991 Data
27Figure 3
Probability of Incarceration for a Violent Crime by Draft Eligibility, Nonwhite Males
Panel A: 1979 Data
Panel B: 1986 Data
Panel C: 1991 Data
28Figure 4
Probability of Incarceration for a Nonviolent Crime by Draft Eligibility, Nonwhite Males
Panel A: 1979 Data
Panel B: 1986 Data










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimated Incarceration Probabilities, Males Born 1948-1952
Race: White Nonwhite
Draft Eligibility: Eligible Ineligible Eligible Ineligible
Panel A: Aggregated Survey Waves
All Crime 0.00601 0.00601 0.0337 0.0323
(0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0543) (0.0521)
Violent Crime 0.00240 0.00209 0.0174 0.0161
(0.00548) (0.00512) (0.0376) (0.0352)
All Nonviolent Crime 0.00362 0.00392 0.0163 0.0162
(0.00840) (0.00845) (0.0382) (0.0383)
Drug Crime 0.00202 0.00211 0.00637 0.00638
(0.00678) (0.00683) (0.0276) (0.0277)
Property Crime 0.00333 0.00323 0.0200 0.0192
(0.00764) (0.00739) (0.0420) (0.0410)
Public Order Crime 0.000769 0.000798 0.00429 0.00350
(0.00348) (0.00358) (0.0204) (0.0184)
Panel B: 1979 Survey
All Crime 0.00318 0.00328 0.0254 0.0257
(0.00454) (0.00469) (0.0322) (0.0330)
Violent Crime 0.00150 0.00124 0.0123 0.0130
(0.00314) (0.00288) (0.0221) (0.0234)
All Nonviolent Crime 0.00168 0.00204 0.0131 0.0128
(0.00316) (0.00370) (0.0226) (0.0227)
Drug Crime 0.000309 0.000304 0.00182 0.00137
(0.00140) (0.00138) (0.00855) (0.00752)
Property Crime 0.00143 0.00133 0.0129 0.0133
(0.00300) (0.00298) (0.0237) (0.0242)
Public Order Crime 0.000249 0.000177 0.00158 0.00127
(0.00127) (0.00115) (0.00850) (0.00724)
Panel C: 1986 Survey
All Crime 0.00364 0.00383 0.0256 0.0282
(0.00584) (0.00598) (0.0391) (0.0418)
Violent Crime 0.00225 0.00197 0.0161 0.0175
(0.00463) (0.00423) (0.0315) (0.0329)
All Nonviolent Crime 0.00139 0.00185 0.00957 0.0106
(0.00369) (0.00427) (0.0246) (0.0265)
Drug Crime 0.000362 0.000576 0.00208 0.00238
(0.00174) (0.00236) (0.0117) (0.0125)
Property Crime 0.00196 0.00211 0.0158 0.0175
(0.00429) (0.00439) (0.0312) (0.0334)
Public Order Crime 0.000561 0.000590 0.00302 0.00296
(0.00234) (0.00236) (0.0145) (0.0140)
Panel D: 1991 Survey
All Crime 0.0112 0.0109 0.0501 0.0429
(0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0767) (0.0717)
Violent Crime 0.00344 0.00305 0.0238 0.0178
(0.00755) (0.00712) (0.0519) (0.0455)
All Nonviolent Crime 0.00778 0.00786 0.0263 0.0251
(0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0557) (0.0554)
Drug Crime 0.00538 0.00546 0.0152 0.0154
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0443) (0.0444)
Property Crime 0.00658 0.00626 0.0314 0.0267
(0.0115) (0.0110) (0.0597) (0.0570)
Public Order Crime 0.00150 0.00163 0.00827 0.00626
(0.00533) (0.00553) (0.0306) (0.0275)
Notes: Observations are at the exact day of birth by survey year level. Incarcer-
ation data are from the 1979, 1986, and 1991 Surveys of Inmates in State and
Federal Correctional Facilities and birth data are from the Vital Statistics of the
United States.
31Table 3
Estimated Eects of Draft Eligibility and Military Service on the Probability of Incarceration,
White Males Born 1948{1952
Survey Years: All 1979 1986 1991
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Incarceration for a Violent Crime
Estimated eect of eligibility 0.00030* 0.00038** 0.00016 0.00036
(0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00023) (0.00036)
TSIV estimated of eect of service 0.00269* 0.00340** 0.00145 0.00323
(0.00142) (0.00144) (0.00204) (0.00322)
Observations 5481 1827 1827 1827
Panel B: Incarceration for a Nonviolent Crime
Estimated eect of eligibility -0.00026 -0.00033* -0.00053*** 0.00009
(0.00024) (0.00018) (0.00019) (0.00064)
TSIV estimated of eect of service -0.00228 -0.00299* -0.00469*** 0.00084
(0.00211) (0.00164) (0.00172) (0.00568)
Observations 5481 1827 1827 1827
Panel C: Incarceration for Any Crime
Estimated eect of eligibility 0.00005 0.00005 -0.00036 0.00046
(0.00028) (0.00025) (0.00030) (0.00072)
TSIV estimated of eect of service 0.00041 0.00041 -0.00324 0.00407
(0.00252) (0.00226) (0.00264) (0.00641)
Observations 5481 1827 1827 1827
Notes: Reduced-form estimates use observations at the exact day of birth by survey year level.
Incarceration data are from the 1979, 1986, and 1991 Surveys of Inmates in State and Federal
Correctional Facilities and birth data are from the Vital Statistics of the United States. All
specications include month-by-year of birth xed eects and survey year xed eects and
weight by the number of individuals represented by the cell. All drafted cohorts include birth
years ranging from 1944 to 1952. Estimated standard errors, clustered on lottery number, are
shown in parentheses. The two-sample instrumental-variable estimates of the eect of military
service on incarceration use the rst-stage estimates shown in Table 1.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
32Table 4
Estimated Eects of Draft Eligibility and Military Service on the Probability of Incarceration,
Nonwhite Males Born 1948{1952
Survey Years: All 1979 1986 1991
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Incarceration for a Violent Crime
Estimated eect of eligibility 0.00183* -0.00058 -0.00093 0.00698***
(0.00097) (0.00114) (0.00150) (0.00247)
TSIV estimated of eect of service 0.02537* -0.00799 -0.01288 0.09697***
(0.01354) (0.01582) (0.02085) (0.03434)
Observations 5481 1827 1827 1827
Panel B: Incarceration for a Nonviolent Crime
Estimated eect of eligibility 0.00024 0.00047 -0.00029 0.00055
(0.00115) (0.00118) (0.00134) (0.00293)
TSIV estimated of eect of service 0.00335 0.00647 -0.00400 0.00759
(0.01601) (0.01638) (0.01867) (0.04068)
Observations 5481 1827 1827 1827
Panel C: Incarceration for Any Crime
Estimated eect of eligibility 0.00207 -0.00011 -0.00121 0.00753*
(0.00156) (0.00172) (0.00191) (0.00388)
TSIV estimated of eect of service 0.02872 -0.00152 -0.01687 0.10456*
(0.02161) (0.02387) (0.02657) (0.05389)
Observations 5481 1827 1827 1827
Notes: See Table 3.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
33Table 5
Estimated Eects of Draft Eligibility on the Probability of Incarceration (per 10,000),
White Males Born 1948{1952,
Narrow Crime Denitions
Survey Years: All 1979 1986 1991
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Violent Crimes
Sex Crime 0.03374 -0.13205 0.03552 0.19774
(0.31716) (0.22670) (0.51963) (0.76831)
Murder 0.40634 0.17080 0.41639 0.63181
(0.34170) (0.34953) (0.50867) (0.84605)
Manslaughter 0.13382 0.21524 -0.10981 0.29604
(0.13928) (0.19748) (0.28355) (0.24733)
Kidnapping 0.45351** 0.48381** 0.56226* 0.31447
(0.19080) (0.21809) (0.29373) (0.38196)
Extortion 0.01105 -0.04555 0.07837 0.00034
(0.06992) (0.03297) (0.05609) (0.20128)
Robbery 0.85441* 0.81421* 0.63964 1.10938
(0.45519) (0.43910) (0.56057) (1.09291)
Assault 0.10965 0.67652** -0.23495 -0.11262
(0.26486) (0.31373) (0.42690) (0.61535)
Panel B: Property Crimes
Burglary -0.07211 0.08748 -0.97245* 0.66864
(0.31622) (0.40238) (0.57465) (0.67238)
Auto Theft 0.04796 0.10163 -0.10132 0.14358
(0.12995) (0.13440) (0.14794) (0.33755)
Arson 0.06069 0.06986 -0.05977 0.17199
(0.15979) (0.10230) (0.20011) (0.41651)
Fraud 0.07990 0.13674 0.06775 0.03521
(0.19691) (0.23200) (0.26385) (0.45214)
Larcency -0.11887 0.17309 -0.61080* 0.08111
(0.19405) (0.21484) (0.34528) (0.47256)
Stolen Property Oense 0.00665 0.26884* -0.43651 0.18762
(0.13211) (0.16185) (0.26825) (0.23332)
Property Damage -0.06099 0.01960 -0.21908 0.01649
(0.05184) (0.04740) (0.13522) (0.06973)
Illegal Entry -0.08197** -0.00436 -0.11659* -0.12495
(0.04055) (0.04258) (0.06728) (0.09374)
Panel C: Drug Crimes
Drug Tracking 0.39876 0.07963 -0.34441 1.46104
(0.75063) (0.25094) (0.36512) (2.18537)
Drug Possession -0.03203 0.03931 -0.51008* 0.37467
(0.43720) (0.20912) (0.29064) (1.27514)
Notes: See Table 3.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
34Table 6
Estimated Eects of Draft Eligibility on the Probability of Incarceration (per 10,000),
Nonwhite Males Born 1948{1952,
Narrow Crime Denitions
Survey Years: All 1979 1986 1991
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Violent Crimes
Sex Crime 0.17018 0.38616 -0.51407 0.63844
(0.26033) (0.31434) (0.44293) (0.57886)
Murder 0.17532 -0.12156 -0.20916 0.85668
(0.31573) (0.39409) (0.55667) (0.75920)
Manslaughter 0.06989 -0.07122 -0.01048 0.29136
(0.15359) (0.12900) (0.27544) (0.35614)
Kidnapping 0.17064 0.07405 -0.04711 0.48497
(0.18084) (0.15431) (0.21741) (0.48335)
Extortion -0.00447 0.06481 -0.08023 0.00200
(0.05761) (0.04665) (0.05642) (0.15825)
Robbery 0.78956 -0.66841 -0.60538 3.64246***
(0.52098) (0.57406) (0.70337) (1.33056)
Assault -0.02074 -0.07555 0.49501 -0.48168
(0.26517) (0.30925) (0.46501) (0.57096)
Panel B: Property Crimes
Burglary 0.84968** 0.87866* 1.04852* 0.62186
(0.33497) (0.46072) (0.61290) (0.61581)
Auto Theft 0.06487 0.07476 0.06209 0.05776
(0.13398) (0.11717) (0.11602) (0.37490)
Arson 0.00660 -0.02283 0.11411 -0.07148
(0.13530) (0.07513) (0.12706) (0.38480)
Fraud -0.18897 -0.19071 -0.77946*** 0.40326
(0.19793) (0.18708) (0.28498) (0.49588)
Larcency -0.18514 0.04169 -0.23127 -0.36585
(0.23576) (0.28554) (0.45778) (0.48803)
Stolen Property Oense 0.25446* 0.10392 0.02929 0.63017*
(0.14225) (0.14835) (0.22070) (0.34554)
Property Damage -0.02929 -0.02694 0.02904 -0.08998
(0.05190) (0.03873) (0.07813) (0.13224)
Illegal Entry 0.03374 0.07862 -0.04960 0.07222
(0.07518) (0.09159) (0.20067) (0.07176)
Panel C: Drug Crimes
Drug Tracking 0.04325 0.07496 0.20255 -0.14777
(0.45920) (0.25159) (0.33590) (1.37148)
Drug Possession 0.12018 0.19166 -0.14244 0.31132
(0.28846) (0.17275) (0.24559) (0.81631)
Notes: See Table 3.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38Appendix 1: Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A1





Probability of Incarceration for a Violent Crime by Draft Eligibility, White Males
Panel A: 1979 Data
Panel B: 1986 Data
Panel C: 1991 Data
40Figure A3
Probability of Incarceration for a Nonviolent Crime by Draft Eligibility, White Males
Panel A: 1979 Data
Panel B: 1986 Data
Panel C: 1991 Data
41Figure A4
Probability of Incarceration for a Violent Crime by Draft Eligibility, Nonwhite Males
Panel A: 1979 Data
Panel B: 1986 Data
Panel C: 1991 Data
42Figure A5
Probability of Incarceration for a Nonviolent Crime by Draft Eligibility, Nonwhite Males
Panel A: 1979 Data
Panel B: 1986 Data
Panel C: 1991 Data
43Table A1
Mean Incarceration Rates (Per 10,000), Males Born 1948-1950
Race: White Nonwhite
Draft Eligibility: Eligible Ineligible Eligible Ineligible
Panel A: Aggregated Survey Waves
All Crime 0.00581 0.00605 0.0319 0.0301
(0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0534) (0.0512)
Violent Crime 0.00237 0.00205 0.0167 0.0139
(0.00552) (0.00529) (0.0378) (0.0337)
All Nonviolent Crime 0.00344 0.00400 0.0152 0.0162
(0.00838) (0.00893) (0.0370) (0.0398)
Drug Crime 0.00181 0.00223 0.00601 0.00680
(0.00669) (0.00726) (0.0268) (0.0294)
Property Crime 0.00312 0.00315 0.0187 0.0174
(0.00751) (0.00772) (0.0411) (0.0408)
Public Order Crime 0.000729 0.000819 0.00419 0.00299
(0.00338) (0.00378) (0.0205) (0.0181)
Panel B: 1979 Survey
All Crime 0.00281 0.00281 0.0239 0.0237
(0.00417) (0.00445) (0.0318) (0.0331)
Violent Crime 0.00132 0.000936 0.0116 0.0111
(0.00290) (0.00250) (0.0219) (0.0232)
All Nonviolent Crime 0.00149 0.00188 0.0123 0.0126
(0.00296) (0.00358) (0.0222) (0.0232)
Drug Crime 0.000277 0.000290 0.00192 0.00166
(0.00132) (0.00139) (0.00885) (0.00837)
Property Crime 0.00124 0.000888 0.0115 0.0116
(0.00278) (0.00232) (0.0234) (0.0239)
Public Order Crime 0.000235 0.000154 0.00145 0.000882
(0.00121) (0.00113) (0.00840) (0.00619)
Panel C: 1986 Survey
All Crime 0.00385 0.00392 0.0243 0.0259
(0.00608) (0.00609) (0.0388) (0.0425)
Violent Crime 0.00241 0.00217 0.0157 0.0161
(0.00492) (0.00443) (0.0315) (0.0339)
All Nonviolent Crime 0.00144 0.00175 0.00854 0.00984
(0.00371) (0.00420) (0.0232) (0.0255)
Drug Crime 0.000316 0.000530 0.00178 0.00212
(0.00165) (0.00238) (0.0104) (0.0119)
Property Crime 0.00205 0.00201 0.0150 0.0156
(0.00438) (0.00446) (0.0310) (0.0332)
Public Order Crime 0.000573 0.000670 0.00252 0.00250
(0.00230) (0.00264) (0.0134) (0.0122)
Panel D: 1991 Survey
All Crime 0.0108 0.0114 0.0477 0.0406
(0.0149) (0.0151) (0.0754) (0.0694)
Violent Crime 0.00337 0.00304 0.0228 0.0144
(0.00755) (0.00747) (0.0524) (0.0413)
All Nonviolent Crime 0.00740 0.00838 0.0249 0.0262
(0.0128) (0.0134) (0.0540) (0.0584)
Drug Crime 0.00485 0.00587 0.0143 0.0166
(0.0108) (0.0114) (0.0432) (0.0474)
Property Crime 0.00606 0.00656 0.0296 0.0249
(0.0114) (0.0117) (0.0582) (0.0569)
Public Order Crime 0.00138 0.00163 0.00860 0.00558
(0.00518) (0.00579) (0.0314) (0.0281)
Notes: Observations are at the exact day of birth by survey year level. Incarcer-
ation data are from the 1979, 1986, and 1991 Surveys of Inmates in State and
Federal Correctional Facilities and birth data are from the Vital Statistics of the
United States.
44Table A2
Mean Incarceration Rates (Per 10,000), Males Born 1951
Race: White Nonwhite
Draft Eligibility: Eligible Ineligible Eligible Ineligible
Panel A: Aggregated Survey Waves
All Crime 0.00623 0.00545 0.0346 0.0320
(0.0102) (0.00933) (0.0568) (0.0515)
Violent Crime 0.00211 0.00187 0.0188 0.0172
(0.00482) (0.00467) (0.0391) (0.0358)
All Nonviolent Crime 0.00412 0.00358 0.0157 0.0148
(0.00851) (0.00757) (0.0379) (0.0360)
Drug Crime 0.00260 0.00165 0.00624 0.00599
(0.00685) (0.00554) (0.0259) (0.0265)
Property Crime 0.00367 0.00291 0.0195 0.0199
(0.00748) (0.00671) (0.0415) (0.0417)
Public Order Crime 0.000697 0.000585 0.00516 0.00364
(0.00314) (0.00296) (0.0228) (0.0180)
Panel B: 1979 Survey
All Crime 0.00383 0.00385 0.0244 0.0236
(0.00484) (0.00524) (0.0309) (0.0302)
Violent Crime 0.00186 0.00159 0.0123 0.0136
(0.00342) (0.00330) (0.0227) (0.0229)
All Nonviolent Crime 0.00197 0.00226 0.0121 0.00996
(0.00347) (0.00410) (0.0209) (0.0190)
Drug Crime 0.000250 0.000389 0.00186 0.00116
(0.00122) (0.00152) (0.00846) (0.00671)
Property Crime 0.00187 0.00162 0.0139 0.0129
(0.00322) (0.00338) (0.0240) (0.0233)
Public Order Crime 0.000263 0.000249 0.00140 0.00104
(0.00129) (0.00139) (0.00781) (0.00654)
Panel C: 1986 Survey
All Crime 0.00308 0.00310 0.0250 0.0289
(0.00516) (0.00557) (0.0353) (0.0400)
Violent Crime 0.00175 0.00149 0.0167 0.0178
(0.00361) (0.00351) (0.0320) (0.0304)
All Nonviolent Crime 0.00133 0.00161 0.00832 0.0111
(0.00354) (0.00411) (0.0201) (0.0302)
Drug Crime 0.000535 0.000474 0.00248 0.00261
(0.00209) (0.00193) (0.0112) (0.0146)
Property Crime 0.00191 0.00166 0.0138 0.0198
(0.00443) (0.00387) (0.0246) (0.0343)
Public Order Crime 0.000440 0.000330 0.00387 0.00346
(0.00229) (0.00169) (0.0174) (0.0174)
Panel D: 1991 Survey
All Crime 0.0118 0.00940 0.0543 0.0435
(0.0146) (0.0134) (0.0834) (0.0726)
Violent Crime 0.00273 0.00254 0.0275 0.0202
(0.00669) (0.00647) (0.0542) (0.0488)
All Nonviolent Crime 0.00907 0.00687 0.0268 0.0233
(0.0125) (0.0111) (0.0574) (0.0502)
Drug Crime 0.00703 0.00409 0.0144 0.0142
(0.0103) (0.00880) (0.0416) (0.0419)
Property Crime 0.00722 0.00544 0.0306 0.0270
(0.0110) (0.00998) (0.0617) (0.0584)
Public Order Crime 0.00139 0.00118 0.0102 0.00641
(0.00469) (0.00459) (0.0342) (0.0248)
Notes: Observations are at the exact day of birth by survey year level. Incarcer-
ation data are from the 1979, 1986, and 1991 Surveys of Inmates in State and
Federal Correctional Facilities and birth data are from the Vital Statistics of the
United States.
45Table A3
Mean Incarceration Rates (Per 10,000), Males Born 1952
Race: White Nonwhite
Draft Eligibility: Eligible Ineligible Eligible Ineligible
Panel A: Aggregated Survey Waves
All Crime 0.00690 0.00641 0.0427 0.0362
(0.0104) (0.0102) (0.0552) (0.0539)
Violent Crime 0.00294 0.00234 0.0193 0.0190
(0.00599) (0.00517) (0.0347) (0.0368)
All Nonviolent Crime 0.00395 0.00407 0.0233 0.0172
(0.00839) (0.00832) (0.0442) (0.0378)
Drug Crime 0.00244 0.00232 0.00863 0.00601
(0.00715) (0.00707) (0.0338) (0.0256)
Property Crime 0.00407 0.00365 0.0284 0.0216
(0.00848) (0.00736) (0.0467) (0.0406)
Public Order Crime 0.00109 0.000946 0.00372 0.00425
(0.00435) (0.00371) (0.0154) (0.0193)
Panel B: 1979 Survey
All Crime 0.00445 0.00360 0.0350 0.0310
(0.00579) (0.00454) (0.0347) (0.0347)
Violent Crime 0.00207 0.00147 0.0162 0.0156
(0.00394) (0.00306) (0.0219) (0.0241)
All Nonviolent Crime 0.00238 0.00213 0.0188 0.0154
(0.00373) (0.00355) (0.0260) (0.0245)
Drug Crime 0.000566 0.000254 0.00124 0.00107
(0.00198) (0.00123) (0.00688) (0.00664)
Property Crime 0.00195 0.00184 0.0190 0.0164
(0.00373) (0.00349) (0.0241) (0.0251)
Public Order Crime 0.000310 0.000156 0.00255 0.00214
(0.00153) (0.000944) (0.00984) (0.00917)
Panel C: 1986 Survey
All Crime 0.00316 0.00430 0.0341 0.0314
(0.00521) (0.00609) (0.0446) (0.0421)
Violent Crime 0.00198 0.00204 0.0171 0.0198
(0.00400) (0.00442) (0.0313) (0.0331)
All Nonviolent Crime 0.00118 0.00225 0.0170 0.0116
(0.00382) (0.00450) (0.0347) (0.0249)
Drug Crime 0.000406 0.000744 0.00328 0.00260
(0.00175) (0.00266) (0.0181) (0.0115)
Property Crime 0.00154 0.00267 0.0232 0.0189
(0.00349) (0.00464) (0.0389) (0.0327)
Public Order Crime 0.000649 0.000675 0.00474 0.00333
(0.00261) (0.00232) (0.0160) (0.0136)
Panel D: 1991 Survey
All Crime 0.0131 0.0113 0.0588 0.0463
(0.0144) (0.0147) (0.0749) (0.0750)
Violent Crime 0.00478 0.00352 0.0247 0.0216
(0.00846) (0.00703) (0.0463) (0.0487)
All Nonviolent Crime 0.00830 0.00782 0.0341 0.0247
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0620) (0.0546)
Drug Crime 0.00634 0.00595 0.0214 0.0144
(0.0112) (0.0110) (0.0533) (0.0412)
Property Crime 0.00873 0.00644 0.0430 0.0294
(0.0126) (0.0108) (0.0646) (0.0561)
Public Order Crime 0.00232 0.00201 0.00387 0.00730
(0.00675) (0.00578) (0.0191) (0.0289)
Notes: Observations are at the exact day of birth by survey year level. Incarcer-
ation data are from the 1979, 1986, and 1991 Surveys of Inmates in State and
Federal Correctional Facilities and birth data are from the Vital Statistics of the
United States.
46Appendix 2: Alternative Strategies for Calculating Births
per Day
As we describe in the main text, in order to calculate incarceration rates for exact dates of birth, we
must construct the number of births per day based on the Vital Statistics of the United States, which
only reports births per month for the cohorts we consider. The results we show throughout the
paper apportion the number of births in each month evenly across the days in each month. In this
section, we describe two alternative strategies that give nearly identical results. The rst alternative
that we have considered accounts for diering birth patterns across weekdays and weekends. It has
been documented that in recent periods more cesarean sections and birth inductions take place
on each weekday than on each weekend day (Dickert-Conlin and Chandra 1999), possibly because
doctors want to schedule these procedures on days when the hospital is more heavily staed. To
account for this weekday-weekend variation, we match each day of the week in the data for our
cohorts of interest to the same day of the week in the 1969 data for which we have daily birth
counts. The percentage of births in the month that occurred on that day in the later data is
used to apportion the total monthly births in the earlier data across days. Consider January 1st,
1950 which was a Sunday. The rst Sunday in 1969 was January 5th. In 1969 2.7% of January
births occurred on the rst Sunday. So 2.7% of the births in January 1950 are assigned to January
1st, 1950. This procedure is repeated for each day and the percentages of birth in each month are
normalized to 100. For some years the days in the rst or last week of the year are matched forward
or backward to nd a match. For instance, in 1944 the 53rd week contains a Friday, Saturday, and
Sunday. In 1969 the 53rd week only contains a Tuesday and a Wednesday. So for 1944 the last
three days are assigned the birth percentages on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday that occurred in
the 52nd week instead of the 53rd. Another alternative strategy we have considered recognizes that
birth technology has changed over the 25 years that elapse between the rst year of interest and
1969 (the rst year for which we have births at the day level, as used in the rst alternative strategy
above). We can obtain an estimate of the weekend eect that uses only data from the period of
47interest by exploiting the dierent number of weekend days that fall on a given month across years.
We estimate:
Birthsym =  +   WeekendDaysym + vy + m + ym: (6)
This is a regression of the number of births in each month-year on the number of Saturdays and
Sundays in the month with xed eects for month and year. The coecient  gives the decrease in
the number of births when a month has one additional weekend day. January 1948 had one more
Sunday than January 1947. The number of white births in January 1948 was less than the number
of white births in January 1947. Some of the decrease in the number of births in January 1948 was
due to the weekend eect. Since January had 31 days in both years, some of the decrease in births
was due to births being shifted from the extra weekend day at the end of the month into February.
The number of births in each month are then apportioned out where each weekend day gets a
fewer number of births than each weekday. All weekdays are treated alike and all weekend days are
treated alike. The advantage of this strategy is that it does not impose the weekend eect from a
later era on the monthly birth data from 25 years earlier. We have also explored a variation of this
strategy where the weekend eect is a percentage change in the total monthly births rather than a
xed decrease in the number of births. These strategies likely improve the accuracy of our measures
of births per day and, hence, the accuracy of our measures of incarceration rates. However, because
they do not change the results, we adopt the simpler and more transparent method described in
the main text.
48